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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The environmental justice movement was launched in 1982, 
when residents of Warren County, N.C., protested the construction 
of a hazardous waste landfill in their predominantly African-
American community.1 Minority communities’ sense that such 
hazardous facilities are found disproportionately in their commu-
nities was soon borne out by two landmark studies by the United 
States General Accounting Office (GAO) in 19832 and the United 
Church of Christ in 1987.3 Since then, research has shown consist-
ently that poor and minority households tend to live in more pol-
luted neighborhoods. This correlation appears to be quite robust to 
the statistical methods employed and to the type of pollution con-
sidered, including hazardous waste facilities, landfills, large air 
                                                                                                               
 Associate Professor, Dept. of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, 
Georgia State University, PO Box 3992, Atlanta, GA, 30302, 404-413-0252, 
hsbanzhaf@gsu.edu. For valuable comments, I thank participants in the EPA-Abt Work-
shop on Analytical Methods for Assessing the Environmental Justice Implications of  
Environmental Regulations. I especially thank Matthew Adler, Kelly Maguire, and  
Tauhidur Rahman. 
1. For an introduction to the topic, including these historical origins, see generally 
ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY  
(2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE]. 
2. UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LAND-
FILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING 
COMMUNITIES (1983) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
3. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND 
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987). 
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polluters, and the concentration of air pollutants.4 In short, the 
correlation qualifies as a “stylized fact” as much as anything in  
social science. 
 This finding of a disproportionate environmental burden borne 
by the poor and by people of color motivated President Clinton to 
issue Executive Order (EO) 12898.5 Still in force, the order re-
quires nondiscrimination in federal environmental programs and 
focuses federal resources, such as the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency's (EPA's) Brownfields Program, on low-
income and minority communities.6 EPA defines environmental 
justice as  
                                                                                                               
4. For the classic studies on the location of landfills and hazardous waste facilities, 
see generally ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND 
RACE AT TWENTY: 1987-2007 (2007); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, supra note 3; GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 2. For more recent work, see generally BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA 
FITTON, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE REVISITED (1994); Brett M. Baden & Don L. Coursey, The 
Locality of Waste Sites within the City of Chicago: A Demographic, Social, and Economic 
Analysis, 24 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 53 (2002); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land 
Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE 
L.J. 1383 (1994). On the proximity of large polluters, see generally H. Spencer Banzhaf, 
Joshua Sidon & Randall P. Walsh, Environmental Gentrification and Discrimination, in 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (H. Spencer Banzhaf ed., forthcom-
ing July 2012); Evan J. Ringquist, Equity and the Distribution of Environmental Risk: The 
Case of TRI Facilities, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 811 (1997); James L. Sadd et al., “Every Breath You 
Take…”: The Demographics of Toxic Air Releases in Southern California, 13 ECON. DEV. Q. 
107 (1999); Ann Wolverton, The Role of Demographic and Cost-Related Factors in Determin-
ing Where Plants Locate — A Tale of Two Texas Cities, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EN-
VIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (H. Spencer Banzhaf ed., forthcoming July 2012). On the emissions 
of air pollutants, see generally Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, Do Community Charac-
teristics Influence Environmental Outcomes? Evidence from the Toxics Release Inventory, 65 
S. ECON. J. 691 (1999); Nancy Brooks & Rajiv Sethi, The Distribution of Pollution: Commu-
nity Characteristics and Exposure to Air Toxics, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 233 (1997). On 
estimated air pollution concentrations, see generally Michael Ash & T. Robert Fetter, Who 
Lives on the Wrong Side of the Environmental Tracks? Evidence from the EPA’s  
Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators Model, 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 441 (2004); Rachel Morello-
Frosch, Manuel Pastor & James Sadd, Environmental Justice and Southern California's 
“Riskscape”: The Distribution of Air Toxics Exposures and Health Risks among Diverse 
Communities, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 551 (2001). For the classic book-length introduction to the 
literature over-all, see generally BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 1. For more recent 
reviews and discussion of this literature, see generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL JUSTICE (H. SPENCER BANZHAF ed., forthcoming July 2012); William Bowen, An 
Analytical Review of Environmental Justice Research: What Do We Really Know?, 29 ENVTL. 
MGMT. 3 (2002); Douglas S. Noonan, Evidence of Environmental Justice: A Critical Perspec-
tive on the Practice of EJ Research and Lessons for Policy Design, 89 SOC. SCI. Q. 1153 
(2008); Evan J. Ringquist, Assessing Evidence of Environmental Inequities: A Meta-Analysis, 
24 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 223 (2005); Evan J. Ringquist, Environmental Justice:  
Normative Concerns, Empirical Evidence, and Government Action, in ENVIRONMENTAL POL-
ICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 239 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. 
Kraft eds., 6th ed. 2006). 
5. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
6. See UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL JUS- 
TICE IN EPA BROWNFIELDS COMMUNITIES (2009), available at http://epa.gov/brownfields/ 
policy/ej_brochure_2009.pdf; UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR 
INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN EPA’S NEPA COMPLIANCE ANAL-
YSES (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/region1/ej/pdfs/ej_guidance_nepa_epa0498.pdf  
[hereinafter EPA GUIDANCE]. 
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the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people 
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with re-
spect to the development, implementation, and enforcement 
of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. EPA has 
this goal for all communities and persons across this Na-
tion. It will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same de-
gree of protection from environmental and health hazards 
and equal access to the decision-making process to have a 
healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work.7 
 
This interpretation predominantly situates environmental justice 
within the larger concept of procedural justice, in which EPA’s 
rulemaking and enforcement processes must be fair and open to 
the participation of all. But EPA’s interpretation also hints at the 
goal of distributive justice, according to which the distribution of 
environmental quality should be fair and equitable.8 
 In practice, however, it is impossible to consider the environ-
mental justice order in isolation. After all, it is but one in a series 
of executive orders that have shaped the promulgation of environ-
mental regulations. Perhaps the most important was President 
Reagan’s EO 12291, which required a Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(RIA), including an economic analysis of benefits and costs, for all 
major federal rules.9 President Clinton’s EO 12866 revised this or-
der in some respects, emphasizing the non-quantitative effects of 
rules as well, but maintained the benefit-cost requirement for all 
“economically significant” rules, defined as those having costs 
greater than $100 million.10 More recently, President Obama has 
affirmed these principles in his EO 13563.11 These orders have im-
plicitly made economic efficiency a criterion for evaluating poten-
tial actions to protect the environment. Historically, such efficiency 
                                                                                                               
7. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, Environmental Justice, EPA.GOV, http://www. 
epa.gov/environmentaljustice/index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2012) [hereinafter EPA, Envi-
ronmental Justice]. 
8. But note EPA’s aspiration that “everyone enjoys the same degree of protection” is 
subtly distinct from “enjoys the same level of environmental quality.” Id. Government agen-
cies are not in the business of promising utopia. On the tentative steps taken here toward a 
concept of distributive justice, see generally Matthew D. Adler, Risk Equity: A New Pro-
posal, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2008). For a more general discussion of the relationship 
between environmental justice and these more fundamental notions of justice, see generally 
Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, 
and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 
775 (1998). 
9. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193-94 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
10. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
11. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
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considerations have carried much more weight than other consid-
erations, including environmental justice.12 
 The environmental justice and benefit-cost executive orders, 
like the underlying policy objectives of fairness and efficiency that 
respectively motivate them, interact in important ways. For exam-
ple, RIAs are a crucial part of the opportunity for public participa-
tion, providing critical information on the benefits and costs of 
proposed rules. Yet EPA’s standard practice, like that of other 
agencies, is to document only aggregate benefits and costs, to 
whomsoever they may accrue. This article argues that expanding 
RIAs to include information on the distribution of benefits and 
costs of regulatory actions would provide environmental justice 
communities (and other communities too) with crucial information 
they need to participate fully in the process. Accordingly, providing 
such information would enhance procedural justice. 
 By the same token, documenting distributional effects in RIAs 
would provide the information agencies need to choose rules that 
would foster environmental equity as well as efficiency, enhancing 
distributive justice. Although such distributional effects are rou-
tinely omitted from benefit-cost analyses, both President Clinton’s 
EO 12866 and President Obama’s more recent EO 13563 have ex-
plicitly called for them to be included in such analyses, and there 
is in fact ample precedent for doing so. Thus, the over-arching 
theme of this article is that, far from necessarily being at logger-
heads, the environmental justice and benefit-cost executive orders 
can mutually interact to improve environmental policy-making. 
 This article begins by exploring environmental justice objec-
tives as they have been incorporated into RIAs to date. It sug- 
gests that these objectives have been too limited. In particular, it 
concludes that EPA’s emphasis on providing negative assurance 
that its programs do not exacerbate environmental justice con-
cerns hampers its ability to consider environmental justice factors 
in many regulatory settings. In addition, EPA’s focus on environ-
mental justice considerations at discrete “sites” and the surround-
ing local “communities” limits the domain in which environmental 
justice considerations come into play. Recognizing these limita-
tions, the EPA has recently pledged to integrate environmental 
 
                                                                                                               
12. For discussion of the role of this benefit-cost requirement in environmental regu-
lations, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGU-
LATORY PROTECTION (2002); ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN’S EXECUTIVE ORDER: 
THE ROLE OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS (V. Kerry Smith ed., 1984); REFORMING REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS (Winston Harrington et al. eds., 2009); Robert W. Hahn, Sheila M. 
Olmstead & Robert N. Stavins, Environmental Regulation in the 1990s: A Retrospective 
Analysis, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 377 (2003). 
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justice considerations into the “fabric” of its activities to develop 
regulatory actions.13 
 The paper argues that a more fruitful approach would simply 
be to think in terms of distributional impacts. In particular, RIAs 
should compute the benefits and costs of an action on specific de-
mographic groups, as well as the aggregate benefits and costs. 
Crucially, costs, including indirect costs, must be documented as 
well as benefits, as they are every bit as relevant for the welfare of 
affected groups. 
 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE OBJECTIVES  
AND REGULATORY ACTIONS 
 
 EPA has stated that it “will work to ensure that environmental 
justice is incorporated into the Agency’s regulatory process”14 and 
more recently that it will integrate environmental justice consid-
erations into the “fabric” of its regulatory activities.15 Of course, 
conducting a RIA is an integral part of the regulatory process, yet 
in comparison to the prodigious opportunities for incorporating en-
vironmental justice into an RIA, EPA’s vision appears to be quite 
limited. EPA’s Environmental Justice Strategy begins a statement 
of its objectives by stating: “No segment of the population, regard-
less of race, color, national origin, or income, as a result of EPA’s 
policies, programs, and activities, suffers disproportionately from 
adverse human health or environmental effects . . . .”16 That is, 
EPA appears to be focused more on avoiding exacerbating envi-
ronmental justice concerns than on alleviating pre-existing con-
cerns. In other words, first do no harm.17 
 Unfortunately, when it has incorporated even these limited en-
vironmental justice objectives into its RIAs, EPA has tended to 
stop at perfunctory, pro forma assertions that it is not creating or 
                                                                                                               
13. UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: IN-
TERIM GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DURING THE DEVELOP- 
MENT OF AN ACTION 3-5 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ 
resources/policy/considering-ej-in-rulemaking-guide-07-2010.pdf [hereinafter EPA ACTION 
DEVELOPMENT GUIDE]. 
14. UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE EPA’S ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
STRATEGY 15 (1995), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/ej_ 
strategy_1995.pdf [hereinafter EPA JUSTICE STRATEGY]. 
15. EPA ACTION DEVELOPMENT GUIDE, supra note 13. 
16. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
17. It might be argued that this focus is found in EO 12,898 itself, which mandates 
that “each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by 
identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human 
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority pop-
ulations and low-income populations.” Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629, 7,629 
(Feb. 11, 1994) (emphasis added). However, as discussed infra, in the context of the benefit-
cost executive orders, EO 12,898 can be read as providing a basis for more positive steps. 
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exacerbating an environmental injustice. For example, the RIA for 
arsenic in drinking water consists of these meager 116 words: 
 
Executive Order 12898 establishes a Federal policy for in-
corporating environmental justice into Federal agency mis-
sions by directing agencies to identify and address dispro-
portionately high and adverse human health or environ-
mental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on 
minority and low-income populations. The Executive Order 
requires the Agency to consider environmental justice is-
sues in the rulemaking and to consult with Environmental 
Justice (EJ) stakeholders. 
 
The Agency has considered environmental justice related 
issues concerning the potential impacts of this regulation 
and has determined that there are no substantial dispro-
portionate effects. Because the arsenic rule applies to all 
community water systems, the majority of the population, 
including minority and low-income populations will benefit 
from the additional health protection.18 
 
An only slightly expanded treatment is given in the RIA for disin-
fection byproducts.19 These recent RIAs have not even documented 
this absence of harm, but instead have only given negative assur-
ance that no evidence of harm has come to EPA’s attention. Thus, 
even if EPA confines itself to the objective “do no harm,” there is 
room for improved documentation, for moving from “negative as-
surance” to “positive assurance” that it is doing no harm. 
 One reason for moving beyond simply asserting negative as-
surance toward actually documenting the distributional effects of 
an action is that it would facilitate informed citizen involvement 
and comment. Again, the importance of this involvement was em-
phasized in EO 12898 itself, which emphasizes that agency strate-
gies for environmental justice should,  
 
at a minimum: (1) promote enforcement of all health and 
environmental statutes in areas with minority populations 
and low-income populations; (2) ensure greater public par-
                                                                                                               
18. UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROPOSED ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER 
RULE: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS § 8.9 (2000), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/ 
epa/ria.nsf/vwAN/A200012B.pdf/$file/A200012B.pdf [hereinafter EPA, ARSENIC RIA]. 
19. UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL  
STAGE 2 DISINFECTANTS AND DISINFECTION BYPRODUCTS RULE § 8.10 (2005), available at 
www.epa.gov/safewater/disinfection/stage2/pdfs/anaylsis_stage2_ecconomic_main.pdf [here-
inafter EPA, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR DISINFECTANTS]. 
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ticipation; (3) improve research and data collection relating 
to the health of and environment of minority populations 
and low-income populations; and (4) identify differential 
patterns of consumption of natural resources among minor-
ity populations and low-income populations.20 
 
EPA likewise recognized the role of public participation when it 
noted that environmental justice requires the “meaningful in-
volvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or 
income with respect to the development . . . of environmental laws, 
regulations, and policies.”21 Its Environmental Justice Strategy 
elaborates, “[t]hose who live with environmental decisions—
community residents, State, Tribal, and local governments, envi-
ronmental groups, businesses—must have every opportunity for 
public participation in the making of those decisions. An informed 
and involved community is a necessary and integral part of the 
process to protect the environment.”22 Of course, to be full partners 
in decision making, these groups must have access to relevant data 
about the effects of these environmental actions, as EPA also rec-
ognizes: “EPA will work with affected communities, State, Tribal, 
and local governments, and others to have the best possible infor-
mation available to identify and address disproportionately high 
and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority 
populations and low-income populations.”23 
 Surely, the “best possible information” would include data on 
the distributional effects of a policy. Again, EPA seemingly recog-
nizes this when it writes: “EPA will collect, analyze, and dissemi-
nate data that will compare environmental and human health 
risks to populations identified by race, national origin, or in-
come.”24 But what could be more appropriate than to incorporate 
this information directly into its RIAs, which provide the critical 
information for both technical analysis of and public comment on 
proposed rules? 
 But there is also good reason to move beyond this defensive 
posture. “First do no harm” has always been wise counsel, but 
Hippocrates would never have had much of a medical career if his 
practice had ended there. Like the physician who acts to enhance 
his patient’s health, EPA (or any federal regulatory agency) takes 
actions to achieve national objectives. As explicitly embodied  
in benefit-cost analysis, one of those objectives is to maximize an 
                                                                                                               
20. 59 Fed. Reg. at 7,630 (emphasis added). 
21. EPA, Environmental Justice, supra note 7. 
22. EPA JUSTICE STRATEGY, supra note 14, at 3. 
23. Id. at 10. 
24. Id. at 11. 
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aggregation of individuals’ welfare. But in addition to this efficien-
cy objective, a more equitable distribution of welfare is also a social 
objective in our society. 
 Accordingly, the analysis in an RIA should provide the infor-
mation needed to design regulations with equity in mind as well as 
efficiency. There is ample precedent for doing so. Of course, 
EO 12898 does not explicitly require distributional analysis in  
RIAs, but the actions it specifically mentions are characterized as 
a minimum requirement of federal agencies.25 Because RIAs are a 
crucial source for public comment, by stressing the public partici-
pation of all groups in the development of environmental regula-
tions, the order implicitly requires the documentation of such ef-
fects in RIAs.  
 As previously noted, RIAs are governed primarily by benefit-
cost orders.26 But this overlap poses no problem; to the contrary, 
the environmental justice rationale for documenting distributional 
effects actually reinforces pre-existing precedents for doing so 
within benefit-cost analysis, taken on its own terms. Most recently, 
President Obama’s recent EO 13563, issued January 18, 2011, re-
quires the benefit-cost principle include “distributive impacts and 
equity.”27 This fulfills his earlier call to Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) to produce a set of recommendations for a new Ex-
ecutive Order, with attention to “the role of distributional consid-
erations, fairness, and concern for the interests of future genera-
tions.”28 President Obama was not the first to make this call. In 
setting forth a “statement of regulatory philosophy and principles,” 
President Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 included, “distributive 
impacts” and “equity” as part of benefits, broadly construed, and 
President Bush left this order intact. 29 
 In calling for equity considerations to be folded into benefit-cost 
analysis, these last three presidents have made explicit a principle 
that has been implicit in the United States federal government for 
many years. The EPA’s benefit-cost guidance documents recognize 
the importance of distributional considerations however it rarely 
incorporates them in practice.30 
                                                                                                               
25. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
26. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
27. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
28. REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 12, at 12. 
29. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). Amendments 
to EO 12,866 by President Bush left this language intact. See Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 
Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 26, 2002) and Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2,763 (Jan. 18, 
2007), revoked by Exec. Order 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,113 (Jan. 30, 2009). 
30. UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC 
ANALYSES § 11.1.4 (2010), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-
0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-0568-50.pdf. 
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 More substantively, the United States Water Resource Council 
has long allowed, though not required, effects on the income distri-
bution to be included in benefit-cost analyses of water projects, and 
the OMB approved this practice at least as early as 1983.31 For ex-
ample, OMB has recommended that “[w]hen benefits and costs 
have significant distributional effects, these effects should be ana-
lyzed and discussed, along with the analysis of net present val-
ue.”32 It elaborates: 
 
Analysis should aim at identifying the relevant gainers and 
losers from policy decisions. Effects on the preexisting as-
signment of property rights by the program under analysis 
should be reported. Where a policy is intended to benefit a 
specified subgroup of the population, such as the poor, the 
analysis should consider how effective the policy is in reach-
ing its targeted group.33 
 
Thus, the principle of incorporating distributional considerations 
into the United States’ benefit-cost analysis does not arise for the 
first time with the question of environmental justice. 
 Nor is the United States government alone in adopting  
this principle. Indeed, other nations, like the United Kingdom, 
have incorporated distributional issues into benefit-cost analysis 
much more effectively.34 Furthermore, academic experts in benefit-
cost analysis have called for this approach for decades,35 and they  
                                                                                                               
31. UNITED STATES WATER RES. COUNCIL, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCI-
PLES AND GUIDELINES FOR WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES IMPLEMENTATION STUD-
IES § 1.4.9 (1983), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/CECW/Documents/pgr/pg_ 
1983.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. A-94 REVISED (1992), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094/. 
32. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 31, § 10. 
33. Id. § 10(a). 
34. See H.M. TREASURY, THE GREEN BOOK: APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION IN CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 24-25, 91-96 (2003), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/green_ 
book_complete.pdf. 
35. For a history of efforts to incorporate distributional effects in the academic litera-
ture, see generally H. Spencer Banzhaf, Objective or Multi-objective? Two Historically  
Competing Visions for Benefit-Cost Analysis, 85 LAND ECON. 3 (2009) [hereinafter Banzhaf,  
Objective or Multi-objective?]. For specific early instances of academic experts and practi-
tioners of benefit-cost analysis incorporating distributional effects, see for example, PARTHA 
DASGUPTA ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR PROJECT EVALUATION (1972); ROBERT H. HAVEMAN,  
WATER RESOURCE INVESTMENT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1965); ARTHUR MAASS ET AL., 
DESIGN OF WATER-RESOURCE SYSTEMS: NEW TECHNIQUES FOR RELATING ECONOMIC  
OBJECTIVES, ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, AND GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING (1962); Burton A. 
Weisbrod, Income Redistribution Effects and Benefit-Cost Analysis, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 177 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr. ed., 1968); A. Myrick Freeman III, In-
come Distribution and Planning for Public Investment, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 495 (1967) [here-
inafter Freeman, Income Distribution]; A. Myrick Freeman III, Six Federal Reclamation 
Projects and the Distribution of Income, 3 WATER RESOURCES RES. 319 (1967) [hereinafter 
Freeman, Six Federal Reclamation Projects]; Arnold C. Harberger, On the Use of Distribu-
tional Weights in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis, 86 J. POL. ECON. S87 (1978). 
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continue to endorse it.36 All these authorities—political, academic, 
and historical—have understood that documenting distributional 
effects is essential for understanding the effect of regulatory ac-
tions on all policy objectives, including distributional ones as well 
as efficiency. The relative newer objective of environmental justice 
only reinforces the importance of documenting these effects, both 
for the sake of public participation and, ultimately, for the design 
of regulations. 
 
III. DIFFUSING THE SITUATION 
 
 EPA’s approach to environmental justice is limited in another 
respect as well. In particular, it has tended to focus mainly on local 
environmental problems, discrete in space. For example, EPA’s 
Environmental Justice Strategy and its Toolkit for Assessing Poten-
tial Allegations of Environmental Injustice speak in terms of “ma-
jor facilities” and “sites.”37 It also emphasizes activities such as 
brownfields remediation, the permitting of hazardous waste facili-
ties under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), or 
the permitting of air emissions under the Clean Air Act.38 
 This focus is understandable, for since its origins in the 1982 
protests in Warren County, N.C. over hazardous waste siting and 
in the early research of Robert Bullard on solid waste siting in 
Houston, the three pillars supporting environmental justice—
activism, research, and policy—have traditionally focused on  
discrete sources of pollution to be found at specific points in 
space.39 This local perspective greatly simplifies questions about 
                                                                                                               
36. See, e.g., REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 12; Adler, supra 
note 8; Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCI. 221, 222 (1996); John D. Graham, Saving Lives 
Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 524-26 (2008); Olof 
Johansson-Stenman, Distributional Weights in Cost-Benefit Analysis—Should We Forget 
about Them?, 81 LAND ECON. 337 (2005) [hereinafter Johansson-Stenman, Distributional 
Weights]; Olof Johansson-Stenman, On the Value of Life in Rich and Poor Countries and 
Distributional Weights Beyond Utilitarianism, 17 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 299 (2000) 
[hereinafter Johansson-Stenman, On the Value of Life]. 
37. EPA JUSTICE STRATEGY, supra note 14, at 10-11; UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, TOOLKIT FOR ASSESSING POTENTIAL ALLEGATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE 
passim (2004), available at www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/ej-toolkit.pdf [here-
inafter EPA TOOLKIT]. 
38. EPA JUSTICE STRATEGY, supra note 14, at 12-14, 16-21; EPA TOOLKIT, supra note 
37, passim. There are some exceptions: for example, in addition to brownfields cleanup and 
enforcement of pollution permits, EPA’s environmental justice demonstration projects in-
clude abatement of lead in paint and plumbing and general education programs. EPA  
JUSTICE STRATEGY, supra note 14, at 16-21. 
39. The first generation of research in the 1980s, following the Warren Co. episode, 
followed up with examinations of communities near hazardous waste facilities. See GAO 
REPORT, supra note 2; UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, supra note 3. Soon after, the second gen-
eration of studies in the 1990s looked largely at large polluters listed in the Toxics Release 
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the appropriate spatial scale of analysis, though it by no means 
eliminates them.40 
 But this local approach is also limiting, making it difficult to 
think about diffuse pollutants, widely dispersed through the water 
or air. And many—perhaps most—pollutants fall into this catego-
ry. Even when released from point sources, many pollutants dis-
perse through water or air. Examples include municipal water 
supplies contaminated with disinfectants or disinfection byprod-
ucts or both, which disperse throughout the service area, and the 
long-range transport of air pollutants like fine particulates and 
ozone. Other pollutants are widely dispersed even at the point of 
emissions. Examples include air pollution from mobile sources and 
pathogens like cryptosporidium and giardia from livestock opera-
tions. Arsenic in drinking water is a particularly striking example, 
as it may enter water supplies through groundwater contaminated 
by arsenic occurring naturally in soil and rock, as well as from in-
dustry and agriculture.41 Such pollutants range from EPA’s histor-
ical priorities (pathogens in drinking water, criteria air pollutants) 
to more recent concerns (disinfection byproducts, air toxics). 
 And, in fact, the academic literature has long moved on from 
the bread-and-butter work of comparing the demographics around 
RCRA facilities, TRI facilities, or similar discrete sites. For exam-
ple, Michael Ash and Robert Fetter have compared the distribution 
of modeled concentrations of air toxics—that is an entire spatial 
surface of pollution—to the distribution of demographic groups 
across space.42 Similarly, others have compared the spatial distri-
bution of ozone, a criteria air pollutant, to the spatial distribution 
of demographic groups.43 
 Environmental justice considerations are still relevant to such 
diffuse pollutants because there will still be spatial variation in 
the effects of the action—spatial variation which may be correlated 
with demographics. Such correlations may arise for at least three 
                                                                                                               
Inventory. See, e.g., Arora & Cason, supra note 4; Brooks & Sethi, supra note 4; Sadd et al., 
supra note 4. 
40. See generally Douglas L. Anderton et al., Environmental Equity: The Demo-
graphics of Dumping, 31 DEMOGRAPHY 229 (1994); Brett M. Baden, Douglas S. Noonan  
& Rama Mohana R. Turaga, Scales of Justice: Is There a Geographic Bias in Environmen- 
tal Equity Analysis?, 50 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 163 (2007); Paul Mohai & Robin Saha, 
Reassessing Racial and Socioeconomic Disparities in Environmental Justice Research, 43 
DEMOGRAPHY 383 (2006). 
41. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Basic Information about the Arsenic Rule, EPA.GOV, 
www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
42. Ash & Fetter, supra note 4. 
43. Brooks Depro & Christopher Timmins, Residential Mobility and Ozone Exposure: 
Challenges for Environmental Justice Policy, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL JUSTICE (H. Spencer Banzhaf ed., forthcoming July 2012); Florenz Plassmann & Neha 
Khanna, Household Income and Pollution: Implications for the Debate about the Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis, 15 J. ENV’T & DEV. 22 (2006). 
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reasons. First, the action may affect pollution differently in differ-
ent locations, and those effects may be spatially correlated with 
demographic patterns. Second, even if the effects of an action on 
pollution levels were uniform in space, other spatial differences 
may imply differences in the actual outcomes of interest. For ex-
ample, if the concentration-response function relating pollution 
levels to health effects or other impacts is non-linear, then varia-
tion in background levels of pollution may result in different ef-
fects of even a uniform change in pollution. (For instance, there 
may be no effect of a decrease in pollution if it is already below a 
threshold.) Similarly, differences in background weather or climate 
may interact with a given change in pollution to produce differen-
tial effects. Or, differences in local residents’ opportunities to avoid 
or mitigate pollution may imply different effects from a given 
change in pollution. For example, access to mass transit, air condi-
tioning, or health care may differ across space. If these opportuni-
ties interact with pollution levels in important ways, and if they 
are correlated in space with demographics, then again the impact 
of an action may differ across groups. 
 Third and finally, even with identical changes in pollution and 
identical background conditions, different groups may have differ-
ential responses to a given change in pollution because of some-
thing about the group itself. Such group-level responses could arise 
from genetic differences, differences in economic conditions, differ-
ences in background health and nutrition, or any combination of 
the three. Sometimes there is evidence of such differential impacts 
on sensitive subgroups like children or women of childbearing age, 
but typically our understanding of concentration-response rela-
tionships is insufficient to document differential effects. 
 The differential effects of concern in the context of environmen-
tal justice have always been for particular groups of people: low-
income and minority populations, including African-Americans, 
Hispanics, Asian-Americans, and Native Americans.44 But tradi-
tionally, environmental justice analysts and researchers have  
taken their logical unit of analysis to be the “community,” located 
in a fairly confined place. For example, one might define a com- 
munity which is proximate to a hazardous waste facility or that  
is surrounded by a number of pollution sources. One might  
then look for a suitable “reference community” for purposes of  
 
 
                                                                                                               
44. Naturally, the self-claimed goal (and title) of EO 12,898 itself is “To Address Envi-
ronmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations.” Exec. Order No. 
12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994). For EPA’s definition of “minority” in this context, 
see EPA TOOLKIT, supra note 37, at 17, 44. 
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comparison. One then looks at the demographic groups living in  
these communities.45 
 In the context of dispersed pollutants, it is better to reverse 
this logic. That is, the logical unit of analysis should be the group 
itself. One would then analyze the effects of an action on different 
groups, partly as a function of the communities in which they live. 
Put in these terms, incorporating environmental justice considera-
tions into RIAs boils down to assessing the distributional impacts 
of an action. And such distributional considerations have a long 
history in benefit-cost analysis.46 To be sure, environmental justice 
is a specific instance of such distributional analyses, one focused 
on environmental applications and on the demographic groups 
that have been identified by previous environmental justice re-
search, by the communities themselves, and by agency guidance as 
being most at risk or facing the greatest cumulative burden of ex-
posure to pollution. But as it is a special case of this wider issue, 
environmental justice analysts have the advantage of being able to 
tap into this larger literature. 
 One common argument against incorporating distributional 
effects into benefit-cost analysis is that government projects and 
regulations should be based only on efficiency, while distributional 
considerations should be dealt with in other policy settings, espe-
cially the tax code, welfare programs, and so forth. This perspec-
tive is implicit in the Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation tests 
commonly invoked in benefit-cost analysis, which requires only 
that losers from an action can potentially be compensated for their 
losses out of the winners’ gains, not that they are actually made 
whole inside the policy.47 Similarly, it is implicit in Richard Mus-
grave’s three-branch theory of government (allocation, distribu-
tion, stabilization), as enshrined in his classic textbook on public 
finance.48 It is also implicit in more modern work on optimal  
taxation, in which distributional effects are considered around  
the optimum.49 
 
                                                                                                               
45. For this approach in the classic studies, see for example, BULLARD, DUMPING IN 
DIXIE, supra note 1; GAO REPORT, supra note 2; UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, supra note 3; 
Been, supra note 4. For this approach in EPA’s guidance, see for example, EPA TOOLKIT, 
supra note 37, at 58-63. 
46. See sources cited supra notes 34-36. 
47. See J. R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); 
Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utili-
ty, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). 
48. See generally RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1959). 
49. See, e.g., Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives Should 
Affect Taxes but not Program Choice or Design, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 264 (1979); Louis 
Kaplow, On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to Government 
Policy, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (2004). 
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 To this argument there are two rejoinders. First, actual com-
pensations for the distributional effects of government projects and 
regulations are exceedingly rare, if not an outright fiction. At any 
rate, the tax system is far from optimal, so any regulatory action 
that effects a desirable transfer in more efficient ways than is be-
ing done through the tax code should be given credit for this 
achievement.50 Second, as Stephen Marglin has argued, socially we 
care not only about the size of the pie and its distribution, but also 
the method of slicing it. Many would prefer to see a disadvantaged 
group aided through jobs or environmental protection than 
through the dole, for example.51 The simplest way of making the 
point is that if redistribution is a national objective, then any regu-
latory action that promotes this objective, ceteris paribus, is obvi-
ously preferable to one that does not. 
 Perhaps the best example of recent work incorporating distri-
butional issues into benefit-cost analyses of environmental regula-
tions is work by Ronald Shadbegian, Wayne Gray, and Cynthia 
Morgan on the distributional effects of the sulfur dioxide trading 
program enacted in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.52 They 
compute estimated changes in particulate matter, and the conse-
quent changes in mortality, at the county level. Using a model of 
the United States electricity sector and its costs of abating pollu-
tion,53 they compute control costs at the state level.54 Then, assum-
ing that costs are passed on to consumers and that all households 
consume the same amount of electricity, they compute per-capita 
costs at the state level.55 Finally, they compute estimated net bene-
fits by different demographic groups, including African-Americans, 
Hispanics, and the poor.56 More recently, other researchers have 
undertaken a still more detailed distributional analysis of the 
highway diesel fuel rule, but do not consider benefits and costs.57 
                                                                                                               
50. See Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Integrating Expenditure and Tax Decis- 
ions: The Marginal Cost of Funds and the Marginal Benefit of Projects, 54 NAT’L TAX J.  
189 (2001). 
51. Stephen A. Marglin, Objectives of Water-Resource Development: A General State-
ment, in DESIGN OF WATER-RESOURCE SYSTEMS: NEW TECHNIQUES FOR RELATING ECONOM-
IC OBJECTIVES, ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, AND GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING 17-18, 66-67 (1962). 
52. Ronald J. Shadbegian et al., Benefits and Costs from Sulfur Dioxide Trading: A 
Distributional Analysis, in ACID IN THE ENVIRONMENT: LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE 
PROSPECTS (Gerald R. Visgilio & Diana M. Whitelaw eds., 2007). 
53. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., CTR. FOR ENERGY & ENVTL. POLICY RESEARCH, 
EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM: EVALUATION OF COMPLIANCE 
COSTS AND ALLOWANCE MARKET PERFORMANCE (1997). 
54. Shadbegian et al., supra note 52, at 249-55. 
55. Id. at 252-53. 
56. Id. at 254-55. 
57. Ellen Post et al., Distributional Benefit Analysis of a National Air Quality Rule, 8 
INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 1872 (2011). For the original RIA of the diesel rule, see 
UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: HEAVY DUTY EN-
GINE AND VEHICLE STANDARDS AND HIGHWAY DIESEL FUEL SULFUR CONTROL REQUIRE-
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 Many of EPA’s RIAs are already detailed enough, and make 
use of scientific and economic models sufficiently rich enough, that 
extending them to incorporate such distributional issues would  
require only modest additional effort. EPA’s RIA for its arsenic 
rule and its disinfectants and disinfection byproducts rule are cas-
es in point.58 For example, in the arsenic RIA, EPA identified a dis-
tribution of costs across individual water treatment systems (from 
under 100 people served to over 1 million).59 In some cases, indi-
vidual systems were modeled; in others, it categorized systems by 
statistical distributions. EPA considered the capital and operating 
costs of achieving a proposed arsenic standard using various 
treatment technologies, given background arsenic levels at each 
system. It then computed the least-cost method for individual facil-
ities to achieve a standard, given background arsenic levels. These 
costs reflect the economies of scale enjoyed by larger facilities as 
well as the distribution of background arsenic levels.60 Similarly, 
EPA determined benefits for its arsenic rule based on the popula-
tion, by age category, exposed to various levels of arsenic. This 
combination of exposures and exposed populations implied the 
number of cases of bladder cancer that could be expected with and 
without the regulation.61 
 With these data and with this conceptual architecture, EPA 
essentially has already approached a distributional analysis in the 
style of Shadbegian et al.. It simply did not follow through to break 
them out and report them in the same way. In particular, once 
EPA had determined benefits and costs by water treatment sys-
tems, virtually all the steps needed to compute costs and benefits 
by demographic group were completed. All that would remain to be 
done would be to determine who lives in each of those systems, a 
small additional step in light of the tremendous amount of work 
that was done in the analysis.62 
 
 
 
                                                                                                               
MENTS (2000), available at http://epa.gov/otaq/highway-diesel/regs/2007-heavy-duty-
highway.htm. 
58. EPA, ARSENIC RIA, supra note 18; EPA, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR DISINFECTANTS, 
supra note 19. 
59. EPA, ARSENIC RIA, supra note 18, § 6.2.5. 
60. See EPA, ARSENIC RIA, supra note 18, § 6. 
61. See id. § 5. 
62. EPA individually modeled only the water treatment facilities serving the largest 
populations. Smaller facilities were characterized by a statistical distribution. This lowers 
the accuracy of both the estimated aggregate benefits as well as potentially estimated dis-
tributional effects, but in principle does not make it harder to extend the analysis to the 
latter, so long as the locations of the set of facilities in the statistical analysis are known. 
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IV. DISTRIBUTION OF WHAT? 
 
A. General Considerations 
 
 How best to incorporate distributional effects into RIAs will 
depend on the distributional objectives. More equity, ceteris pari-
bus, may be desirable, but equity of what? Of exposure to a partic-
ular contaminant (arsenic, say, in the case of the arsenic rule, or 
disinfection byproducts for the Stage 2 rule)? Of environmental 
health generally? Or, most generally, overall welfare? In some re-
spects, this is a false choice. We care about environmental health 
because it affects overall welfare. 
 Accordingly, the most fundamental distributional objective is 
equity in welfare. Because it is the most fundamental, it is this ob-
jective that should guide our thinking about incorporating envi-
ronmental justice considerations into RIAs. This conclusion may 
seem counterintuitive. After all, does not the “environmental” in 
“environmental justice” imply a concern about equity in environ-
mental health per se? Actually, not necessarily. Instead, we can 
interpret it as implying a concern about the environment insofar 
as it affects overall welfare. 
 Indeed, focusing on more narrow types of equity could well re-
sult in counterintuitive and unintended, even perverse, decision 
rules for policy. Suppose, for example, that there is some particular 
environmental contaminant which minorities are actually less ex-
posed to than whites. Suppose further that a particular regulatory 
action under consideration turns out to reduce the environmental 
concentrations of this contaminant, with reductions especially 
large in the minority communities.63 If the underlying objective 
motivating distributional analyses were equity in a particular con-
taminant, the RIA would have to down-weight the net benefits of 
this action on the grounds that it helped the minority group! This 
is hardly a move toward greater justice if the minority group is 
otherwise disadvantaged. The problem, of course, lies in the mis-
characterization of the objective. If the objective were instead 
greater equity in overall welfare, the benefit-cost analysis of this 
regulation would over-weight the net benefits of the action for its 
preferential treatment of the minority group. 
 To say that we are concerned with the distribution of overall 
welfare is a start, but other questions about what constitutes wel-
fare soon follow. An early step of any RIA is to identify the poten-
tial impacts of an action which need to be analyzed. Similarly, an 
                                                                                                               
63. Though this scenario is unlikely in most cases, it might well happen for some par-
ticular contaminant. In any case, I propose it only as a thought experiment. 
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early step of any benefit-cost analysis is to identify those impacts 
to be monetized. Should all of those effects be of interest for any 
distributional analysis? The relevant effects will differ on a case-
by-case basis, but four general issues warrant discussion, two on 
the cost side and two on the benefit side. 
 
B. Cost-side Considerations 
 
 First, and most important, it is essential to emphasize that 
overall welfare includes costs as well as benefits. Thus, it is  
not sufficient to look at the distribution of gross environmental  
benefits. It is the distribution of net benefits that is of ultimate in-
terest. Wherever possible, RIAs should document the distribution-
al effects of net benefits, as in the work by Shadbegian et al. on  
the Clean Air Act amendments.64 As an alternative, it may be suf-
ficient to separately document the distribution of benefits and 
costs. As noted above, OMB specifically mentions costs as well  
as benefits when discussing distributional effects.65 Moreover,  
EPA has recognized the importance of costs within an expansive 
framework for understanding environmental justice.66 In particu-
lar, EPA’s Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice  
Concerns in EPA’s NEPA Compliance Analyses urges “considera-
tion of the distribution of costs to pay for environmental  
projects,” as when there are user fees, for example.67 It also  
notes that populations intended to benefit from regulations  
may rely on polluting industries for jobs and tax revenue, so that 
they may experience economic costs indirectly.68 
 
C. Indirect Costs 
 
 The importance of jobs and the local tax base to citizens’ wel-
fare leads directly to the second issue, namely, indirect effects 
transmitted through markets (or, in the economist’s jargon, so-
called “general equilibrium” effects). Wherever possible, such ef-
fects should be considered in RIAs of dispersed pollutants. This 
recommendation does not follow simply from a commitment to 
thoroughness. It follows from research showing the importance of 
general equilibrium effects on the distribution of net benefits.69 For 
                                                                                                               
64. Shadbegian et al., supra note 52. 
65. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 31, § 10. 
66. EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 6, § 2.3, Exhibit 3. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See generally DON FULLERTON, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
ENERGY POLICY (Don Fullerton ed., 2009). 
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example, the indirect effects of a regulatory action on welfare 
through land markets may be particularly important. Because  
pollution is undesirable, the demand for housing in a polluted 
neighborhood is lower than in a clean neighborhood, lowering 
housing values. Poor people may live in these neighborhoods be-
cause they cannot afford to purchase more expensive housing in 
cleaner locations.70 This is not to say that they do not value a clean 
environment as much as richer households. But because of their 
limited income, their willingness to pay for a clean environment is 
lower. The reverse of this logic is that when neighborhoods im-
prove, demand increases and housing values rise. But housing 
prices may rise by more than existing residents’ values for the en-
vironment, as richer gentrifying households bid up housing values 
by their own higher willingness to pay for the improvement. If the 
incumbent residents owned their home, they would of course reap 
the capital gains from these appreciating housing values. But in 
the United States, eighty-three percent of people living in poverty 
and receiving public assistance are renters.71 These residents 
would have to pay higher rents, and the increase in these rents 
may more than offset the direct benefit they receive from the envi-
ronmental improvement.72 
 My colleagues and I have called this process “environmental 
gentrification.”73 In empirical work examining air quality im-
provements in Los Angeles, we show that incorporating these  
general equilibrium effects significantly alters the distribution of 
net benefits of air quality improvements, with renters in those  
communities which began as the most polluted, but which saw the 
                                                                                                               
70. This raises the possibility that disadvantaged groups sometimes “come to the nui-
sance,” as opposed to polluting facilities coming to their neighborhoods. For evidence on 
both sides of this debate, see Baden & Coursey, supra note 4; H. Spencer Banzhaf & Randall 
P. Walsh, Do People Vote with their Feet? An Empirical Test of Tiebout’s Mechanism, 98 AM. 
ECON. REV. 843 (2008); Been, supra, note 4; Vicki Been with Francis Gupta, Coming to 
the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice 
Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1997); Depro & Timmins, supra note 43; Manuel Pastor, Jr., 
Jim Sadd & John Hipp, Which Came First? Toxic Facilities, Minority Move-in, and Envi-
ronmental Justice, 23 J. URB. AFF. 1 (2001); Wolverton, supra note 4. Also, see generally H. 
Spencer Banzhaf & Eleanor McCormick, Moving Beyond Cleanup: Identifying the Crucibles 
of Environmental Gentrification, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
(H. Spencer Banzhaf ed., forthcoming July 2012). 
71. See U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, CENSUS.GOV, http://factfinder2. 
census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
72. See sources cited supra note 70. For a more whimsical take on this issue, see  
Armen A. Alchian, The Beneficiaries of Cleaner Air, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ARMEN A. 
ALCHIAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 145 (Daniel K. Benjamin ed., 2d vol. 
2006). 
73. Holger Sieg et al., Estimating the General Equilibrium Benefits of Large Changes 
in Spatially Delineated Public Goods, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 1047, 1074 (2004); Banzhaf & 
McCormick, supra note 70. 
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greatest improvement in air quality, being harmed the most.74 In 
extensions of this work re-examining benefit-cost analyses of the 
Clean Air Act, we show that these effects have tremendous im-
portance for the relative winners and losers of actual environmen-
tal policies.75 Far from being only of academic interest, these gen-
trification effects have been identified by the National Environ-
mental Justice Advisory Commission (NEJAC) as an important 
unintended consequence of some environmental policies, such as 
brownfields redevelopment.76 
 Land markets are not the only avenue for important general 
equilibrium effects with distributional implications. Compliance 
costs fall on firms and thence the owners of capital, who are gener-
ally rich, but some of those costs may be passed on through higher 
prices. For example, the Clean Air Act has substantially raised the 
price of energy-intensive goods.77 If energy-intensive goods are 
consumed disproportionately by the poor, the distribution of costs 
could be regressive. Moreover, if regulatory actions work through 
cap-and-trade-style permit markets, they produce assets with 
marketable value. If those assets are given to firms (as when pollu-
tion permits are grandfathered), they create new sources of wealth 
for the owners of capital (primarily the rich). Consequently, regu-
latory actions with grandfathered permits, such as the United 
States’ SO2 trading program, appear to be quite regressive when 
the indirect effects of asset prices and output prices are considered. 
The poor bear the burden of higher electricity prices, while the 
wealthy, through their ownership of capital, receive the rents from 
the permit allocation.78 
 The importance of such general equilibrium effects for benefit-
cost analysis has been recognized by OMB. OMB notes: 
 
Individuals or households are the ultimate recipients of  
income; business enterprises are merely intermediaries. 
                                                                                                               
74. Sieg et al., supra note 73. 
75. V. Kerry Smith et al., General Equilibrium Benefits for Environmental Improve-
ments: Projected Ozone Reductions under EPA’s Prospective Analysis for the Los Angeles Air 
Basin, 47 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 559 (2004); see also Corbett A. Grainger, The Distribu-
tional Effects of Pollution Regulations: Rental Housing and Air Quality Improvements  
(Jan. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, Job Market Paper), available at http://www.econ. 
gatech.edu/files/seminars/Grainger_Rents.pdf. 
76. NAT’L ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, UNINTENDED IMPACTS OF REDEVELOP-
MENT AND REVITALIZATION EFFORTS IN FIVE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES 1 
(2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/publications/nejac/ 
redev-revital-recomm-9-27-06.pdf. 
77. See Michael Hazilla & Raymond J. Kopp, Social Cost of Environmental Quality 
Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. POL. ECON. 853, 870-71 (1990). 
78. See Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W.H. Parry, Instrument Choice in Environmental 
Policy, 2 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 152, 155-59, 164-66 (2008); Ian W.H. Parry, Are Emis-
sions Permits Regressive?, 47 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 364, 377-80 (2004). 
20 JOURNAL OF LAND USE [Vol. 27:1 
Analyses of distribution should identify economic incidence, 
or how costs and benefits are ultimately borne by house-
holds or individuals. 
 
Determining economic incidence can be difficult because 
benefits and costs are often redistributed in unintended and 
unexpected ways. For example, a subsidy for the production 
of a commodity will usually raise the incomes of the com-
modity’s suppliers, but it can also benefit consumers of the 
commodity through lower prices and reduce the incomes for 
suppliers of competing products. A subsidy also raises the 
value of specialized resources used in the production of the 
subsidized commodity. As the subsidy is incorporated in as-
set values, its distributional effects can change.79 
 
In any case, the key point is that once we accept the objective to be 
overall welfare, then all channels by which a regulatory action sig-
nificantly affects welfare should be documented in an RIA. 
 Whether the most important general equilibrium effects are to 
be found in land markets, product markets, or labor markets, or 
whether they are important at all, will differ from case to case. 
Land markets and gentrification may be particularly important for 
the traditional case of locally undesirable land uses and large point 
sources of pollution. Because they are so obviously observed by res-
idents, these sources of pollution are easily incorporated into the 
demand for land, and hence into land prices. But some widely dis-
persed pollution, like the criteria air pollutants, are also fairly easy 
to observe and have been shown to affect property values.80 
 
D. Inter-group Heterogeneity in Values 
 
 To these two cost-side considerations about what constitutes 
overall welfare we can add two benefit-side considerations. The 
third issue to consider is group-level heterogeneity in willingness 
to pay for health and environmental improvements. Providing  
a clean environment, like any other good, comes at the cost of other 
private or public goods that could have been provided with those 
resources. Determining the right balance between environment- 
                                                                                                               
79. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 31, § 10(b). 
80. See Patrick Bayer, Nathaniel Keohane & Christopher Timmins, Migration and 
Hedonic Valuation: The Case of Air Quality, 58 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (2009); Kenneth 
Y. Chay & Michael Greenstone, Does Air Quality Matter? Evidence from the Housing Mar-
ket, 113 J. POL. ECON. 376 (2005); Grainger, supra note 75; V. Kerry Smith & Ju-Chin 
Huang, Can Markets Value Air Quality? A Meta-Analysis of Hedonic Property Value Models, 
103 J. POL. ECON. 209 (1995). 
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al improvements and costs is the objective of RIA. But different 
groups may be willing to make those tradeoffs differently, perhaps 
because of differences in their ability to pay, because of their  
differential access to other substitutes, or because of differences  
in preferences. 
 Introducing heterogeneity in willingness to pay into benefit-
cost analysis seemingly poses a dilemma. On the one hand, we 
should not impose costs on one group that it is not willing or  
able to bear in order to achieve some benefit that another group 
desires. To the contrary, we do the greatest justice to groups when 
we honor their ability to set their own priorities.81 On the other 
hand, allowing for heterogeneity in willingness to pay for benefits 
appears to discriminate against groups with lower valuations,  
biasing benefit-cost analysis toward rules that favor other groups. 
The backlash against the “senior death discount” for age-adjusted 
willingness to pay to avoid mortality risks is an example of that 
perception.82 Such a concern is entirely valid for the standard ben-
efit-cost regime without distributional weights. But it is not valid 
for generalized benefit-cost analysis with such weights. Indeed, 
this distinction might be viewed as the best argument for why dis-
tributional weights are necessary to give benefit-cost analysis 
more integrity. 
 Consider a hypothetical example of two policies that will save 
lives. Suppose further, the average value of a statistical life (VSL) 
is $6 million, but the VSL of the rich is $8 million and the VSL of 
the poor, because of their lower income, is $4 million. By virtue of 
the very fact of what it means to be poor, the poor cannot afford to 
pay as much money to reduce risks to their health and safety 
without foregoing other basic needs, while the rich can make such 
purchases while only foregoing luxuries. That is, these differences 
can be driven by the differences in ability to pay, even if prefer-
ences or “tastes” are the same. 
 
                                                                                                               
81. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 8, at 802-07 (emphasizing as an example the im-
portance of “sovereignty” for Native Americans). 
82. On the controversy, see Katharine Q. Seelye & John Tierney, E.P.A. Drops Age-
Based Cost Studies, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/08/us/epa-
drops-age-based-cost-studies.html. On the economic and empirical basis for such discounts, 
see generally Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Age Differences in the Value of Statistical 
Life: Revealed Preference Evidence, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 241 (2007); Mary F. Evans 
& V. Kerry Smith, Do We Really Understand the Age-VSL Relationship?, 28 RES. & ENERGY 
ECON. 242 (2006); Alan Krupnick, Mortality-Risk Valuation and Age: Stated Preference Evi-
dence, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 261 (2007); W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, Labor 
Market Estimates of the Senior Discount for the Value of Statistical Life, 53 J. ENVTL. ECON. 
& MGMT. 377 (2007). For a critique of this practice, see Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Sta-
tistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 192-94 (2000). For a rejoinder, see Graham, 
supra note 36. 
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 Consider now two policies, Policy A and Policy B, that save 
lives. Details of the two policies are illustrated respectively in Ta-
bles 1A and 1B infra. The tables show that both policies impose 
gross costs of $1.7 billion on the rich but nothing on the poor. Poli-
cy A saves 100 statistical lives of the rich and 200 statistical lives 
of the poor, for a total of 300 statistical lives. Policy B saves 200 
lives of the rich and 50 lives of the poor, for a total of only 250 
lives. Both policies cost the same, yet Policy A saves more lives. 
Using the average VSL of $6 million implies aggregate net benefits 
of $100 million for Policy A, compared to an aggregate loss of $200 
million for Policy B. Because it saves more lives at the same cost, 
Policy A must look better using this approach. If we use heteroge-
neous values, however, Policy A would generate -$900 million in 
net benefits for the rich and only $800 million in net benefits for 
the poor, for an aggregate loss of $100 million. Policy B would gen-
erate -$100 million in net benefits for the rich and $200 million in 
net benefits for the poor, for a net gain of $100 million in aggre-
gate. Policy B has higher net benefits. Thus, using heterogeneous 
values, the efficiency criterion seemingly steers us to Policy B be-
cause it saves more rich lives. This would seem to imply that so-
cially, we would trade 100 lives of the poor for 50 lives of the rich. 
Nothing could be less just or more reprehensible. 
 Yet in fact, the supposed choice of Policy B does not follow from 
using heterogeneous VSLs per se, but only from doing so without 
distributional weights. Giving greater weight to the net benefits of 
the poor would have steered us back to Policy A, which intuitively 
is the right choice.83 Why use heterogeneous VSLs if we are going 
to undo them with the distributional weights? The reason can be 
made clear with the following example. 
 Consider two different policies, Policy C and Policy D, illustrat-
ed respectively in Tables 1C and 1D, infra. Both policies cost $700 
million, but the split is $350 for rich and poor alike for Policy C, 
whereas with Policy D the split is $600 million for the rich and 
$100 million for the poor. Both policies save 150 lives, but Policy C 
saves 100 of the 150 from the rich, while Policy D saves 100 of the 
150 from the poor. Using homogenous VSLs of $6 million, we see 
that the aggregate net benefits of both policies are $200 million. 
Using the efficiency criterion alone, the two policies appear to be 
tied. Looking next at distributional considerations, we would say  
that Policy C is better, because compared to Policy D it results in a 
                                                                                                               
83. More precisely, a precise relationship between the social welfare of utilities of the 
rich and poor, respectively, the value of money to the rich and poor, and the value of avoid-
ing risks to the rich and poor can be identified that would just offset one another so as to 
generate equal VSLs. However, this relationship need not hold in practice. See Johansson-
Stenman, On the Value of Life, supra note 36, at 304. 
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costless transfer of $50 million from the rich to the poor. Policy C 
looks more favorable, so using these criteria we would choose it 
over Policy D. But this is the wrong conclusion. When we consider 
the groups’ true VSLs, we now see that both groups are better off 
under Policy D than Policy C. Under Policy D, the poor get $100 
million in net benefits versus only $50 million under Policy C, 
while the rich get $200 million versus $50 million. 
 The problem with Policy C is that the additional 50 lives saved 
from the poor over Policy D come at an incremental cost to the poor 
of $250 million, while the group is only willing to pay $200 million 
for those statistical lives. These costs may be direct effects (higher 
cost for water or energy) or indirect effects (higher rents or higher 
costs for consumer goods). In any case, imposing homogeneity in 
values does violence to each group’s preferences. It requires the 
poor group to actually pay a cost they cannot afford: for them, 
more basic priorities (perhaps food and shelter) take precedence 
over the reduction in pollution, whereas the rich can afford the 
cost. Again, true environmental justice respects groups’ own pref-
erences rather than imposing them from the outside.84 
 The reason for the seeming dilemma is that in evaluating the 
relative merits of Policies A and B, we jumped too quickly to the 
conclusion that using heterogeneous VSLs favors Policy B. In fact, 
we only found that the efficiency criterion alone favored Policy B. 
What this actually shows is not the importance of imposing homo-
geneity in willingness-to-pay values, but the importance of consid-
ering the equity objective as well. Considering heterogeneous val-
ues, we see that Policy A, relative to Policy B results in a transfer 
of $600 million to the poor ($800 million to $200 million) at a cost 
of $800 million to the rich. Whether this distributional improve-
ment is worth the loss in aggregate benefits is not necessarily ob-
vious to everybody. But those who would argue that Policy A is 
preferable to B are essentially claiming that it is. 
 The only way to make the “right” choice in both comparisons (A 
over B and D over C) is to consider both heterogeneity in willing-
ness to pay and distributional objectives in the analysis. This is a 
two-step process. First, when comparing benefits for a group to 
costs for the same group, that group’s preferences should be re-
spected. This is the only way to respect the group’s preferences and 
its consumer sovereignty. The result of this step is group-by-group 
net benefits. Then, in the second step, group-level net benefits  
should be compared to one another or aggregated using some kind  
of social weight, or both. For example, using a social weight of 2:1 
for the poor group relative to the rich would exactly undo the effect 
                                                                                                               
84. Foster, supra note 8, at 802-07. 
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of the higher VSL for the rich. Net benefits would now be $700 mil-
lion for Policy A and only $300 million for Policy B. Thus, we would 
now choose Policy A, which saves more lives, over Policy B. Policy 
D would continue to be chosen over Policy C. 
 A logically equivalent way to arrive at the same point would be 
to use the same VSL for all groups, but increase the weight on 
costs to the poor group. Although equivalent logically, this framing 
of the analysis may be more palatable politically. It can also  
be easily explained by the notion that costs to the poor are espe-
cially burdensome because of their more basic needs to be pur-
chased. (In the language of economics, they have a higher margin-
al utility of income.) 
 
E. Nonuse Values 
 
 The fourth and final issue to consider is the role of so-called 
nonuse or existence values in distributional benefits. These are 
values that households have simply for things being a certain way 
rather than for using them to produce some good or service.85 For 
example, EPA’s RIA for the regulation of cooling intake structures 
notes that households may hold significant existence values for the 
marine life that would be spared by the new rules.86 (These values 
would be in addition to use values related to subsistence or recrea-
tional fishing.) It is entirely plausible that a stated preference 
study of such existence values would find that different demo-
graphic groups hold different values for those benefits.  
 If so, should the distribution of nonuse values also be in-
corporated into an analysis of distributional effects? One might ar-
gue in the affirmative, on the grounds that nonuse values are a 
part of overall welfare and benefits are benefits. On the other 
hand, if society’s motivation in considering distributional consider-
ations is to some extent paternalistic, perhaps nonuse values for 
particular groups should not be given extra weight. In any case, 
nonuse benefits are rarely quantified in most RIAs anyway. Ex-
tending the analysis of more tangible benefits (or “use values”), 
routinely quantified in benefit-cost analysis, to distributional  
considerations is a logical first step, before nonuse benefits are 
similarly extended. 
                                                                                                               
85. On the economic theory of nonuse values, see generally A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, 
THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES 137-61 (2d ed. 2003). For a 
defense of the role of nonuse values in federal environmental regulation, see David A. Dana, 
Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343 (2004). 
For critiques of their role, see sources cited supra note 8. 
86. UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS FOR 
THE FINAL SECTION 316(B) PHASE II EXISTING FACILITIES RULE (2004), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/316b/phase2/econbenefits_final.cfm. 
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V. INCORPORATING DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS 
 
 Recognizing the importance of distributional effects is one 
thing; actually incorporating them into environmental RIAs is  
another. How is this to be done in practice? One approach is to  
incorporate the distributional objective into the efficiency objective 
by using distributional weights on net benefits, and then aggregat-
ing them up to total net benefits. That is, net benefits for poorer 
(or other disadvantaged) groups would receive a larger weight 
when aggregating up across groups.87 For example, one common  
approach is to parameterize a utility function of the form 
v(y) = 
 
   
     
where y is income, ρ is a parameter, and a is an arbitrary  
scaling. Then the marginal utility of money is ay-ρ. These margin-
al utilities of money would be the social weights for a house- 
hold with income y.88 
 Just as standard benefit-cost analyses using willingness-to-pay 
weights to combine different benefit categories (morbidity, mortali-
ty, recreation, etc.) into a single aggregate benefit, and uses dollars 
to combine benefits and costs into a single net benefit, so too would 
this approach combine efficiency and distribution by using these 
social welfare weights. Thus, it has the same advantage of reduc-
ing all the policy tradeoffs to a single criterion. Accordingly, this 
approach is advocated by those who have the most ambitious and 
lofty vision for benefit-cost analysis. 
 On the other hand, this approach has two disadvantages. First, 
most utility functions result in very severe penalties on benefits to 
richer households. For example, if, say, ρ = 2 in the above utility 
function (a common rule of thumb), then a household with an in-
come of $100,000 would be given a weight 1/100 of a household 
with an income of $10,000. That is, these weights imply we would 
trade $100 to the first household for $1 to the second, even if the 
other $99 is wasted.89 But however inefficient the tax system, sure-
ly there are more efficient ways to transfer funds than that! Arnold 
Harberger has suggested that one alternative might be to cap the 
                                                                                                               
87. For early advocates of this approach, see for example, Freeman, Income Distribu-
tion, supra note 35; Freeman, Six Federal Reclamation Projects, supra note 35; HAVEMAN, 
supra note 35; Weisbrod, supra note 35. For more recent proposals, see for example, Adler, 
supra note 8; Johansson-Stenman, Distributional Weights, supra note 36; Johansson-
Stenman, On the Value of Life, supra note 36. 
88. See, e.g., Harberger, supra note 35; Johansson-Stenman, Distributional Weights, 
supra note 36; Johansson-Stenman, On the Value of Life, supra note 36. 
89. Harberger, supra note 35, at S112. 
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weights based on the marginal cost of public funds.90 For example, 
based on recent evidence from European countries, the social cost 
of $1 in tax revenue appears to be about $2.91 According to this ap-
proach, the weight on net benefits for the poorest group could be no 
more than two times the weight for the richest group, on the 
grounds that money can be transferred through the tax system at 
that rate of efficiency. 
 The second disadvantage of using distributional weights is  
the flipside of its greatest advantage: its attempt to reduce all ob-
jectives into a single scalar value is too ambitious by half. In mak-
ing this attempt, it arrogates too much power to the benefit-cost 
practitioner.92 An alternative approach is simply to display the dis-
tributional effects alongside aggregate benefits. For example, ta-
bles such as those accompanying the above examples could be dis-
played. Then, based on this information the truly authorized deci-
sion-makers can make the judgment call about the relative merits 
of an action. In other words, the decision-makers could use their 
own judgments—effectively, their own distributional weights—to 
shape policy. 
 This second broad approach of simply documenting distribu-
tional effects can in turn proceed along two paths. One path is to 
document the change in an index that reflects the degree of equi-
ty.93 For example, for changes in income, one might show the 
change in the Gini coefficient or an Atkinson index, two well-
known summary measures of inequality.94 Recently, this approach 
has been extended to indices of distribution in health.95 For exam-
ple, Jonathan Levy et al. compute both the total changes in lives 
and the change in an Atkinson index of mortality rates resulting 
from a number of policies to control particulate emissions from 
buses.96 They then display the combinations of the two objectives 
in a figure, with benefits on one axis and the distributional index 
on the other and various policies plotted in the two dimensions.97 
After providing this information, this approach would stop here 
                                                                                                               
90. Id. at S115. 
91. See Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner, The Marginal Cost of 
Public Funds: Hours of Work Versus Labor Force Participation, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1955 
(2006). 
92. See generally Banzhaf, Objective or Multiobjective?, supra note 35. 
93. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 8. 
94. On both approaches, see Anthony B. Atkinson, On the Measurement of Inequality, 
2 J. ECON. THEORY 244 (1970). 
95. See Jonathan I. Levy, Andrew W. Wilson & Leonard M. Zwack, Quantifying the 
Efficiency and Equity Implications of Power Plant Air Pollution Control Strategies in the 
United States, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 743 (2007); Jonathan I. Levy et al., Evaluating 
Efficiency-Equality Tradeoffs for Mobile Source Control Strategies in an Urban Area, 29 
RISK ANALYSIS 34 (2009) [hereinafter Levy et al., Evaluating Efficiency-Equality Tradeoffs]. 
96. Levy et al., Evaluating Efficiency-Equality Tradeoffs, supra note 95. 
97. Id. at 42. 
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and allow policy makers to make the tradeoffs among these  
two objectives. 
 The second path to documenting distributional effects separate-
ly is simply to display the effects on different groups, whether 
monetized as net benefits or not, in a table. This is the approach 
taken by Shadbegian et al. in their work on the acid rain trading 
program98 and illustrated with the simple example of Table 1 dis-
cussed previously. This approach is probably most appropriate for 
incorporating environmental justice considerations into RIAs for 
two reasons. 
 First, even choosing a summary statistic to capture the distri-
bution of an effect, such as the Atkinson index, unnecessarily im-
poses a judgment about distributional tradeoffs. A policy analyst 
would have to impose assumptions about the importance of inequi-
ty, and not just as measured by the variance of the distribution but 
by higher moments as well.99 Little empirical evidence being avail-
able to justify any assumptions, the analyst would imply a degree 
of false precision.  
 Second, identifying distributional effects only in a single sum-
mary statistic runs counter to the goal of providing information of 
interest to various demographic groups. In contrast, documenting 
the net benefits across groups would provide the most information 
to the public as well as to policy makers. In the short run, fully in-
forming the public of distributional effects in this way would facili-
tate public comments on specific regulations; in the long run, it 
would empower citizens to shape the legislative agenda. In this 
respect, providing information on distributional effects is con-
sistent with one of the leading goals of EO 12898 and EPA’s inter-
pretation of it: public participation.100 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Finding an appropriate way to incorporate environmental jus-
tice considerations into policy-making has been a procedural  
challenge since President Clinton issued Executive Order 12898 
over 15 years ago. Moreover, environmental justice continues to be 
overshadowed by efficiency considerations as embodied in benefit-
cost analysis. 
                                                                                                               
98. Shadbegian et al., supra note 52. 
99. That is, unless one income distribution second-order stochastically dominates an-
other, there may not be a clear-cut ranking between the two. Different indices will variously 
weight different portions of the income distribution, some emphasizing realizations near the 
median, others in the tails of the distribution. Another way to state this is that different 
inequality indices are consistent with different social welfare functions. See generally JAMES 
FOSTER & AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY (2d ed. 1997). 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24 and references therein. 
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 This article has argued that both types of analyses can be en-
hanced by bringing them closer together. In particular, the most 
fruitful way to think about incorporating environmental justice 
consideration into RIAs is to draw on the much older tradition of 
incorporating distributional effects into benefit-cost analysis. En-
vironmental justice considerations are a specific form of such dis-
tributional effects, effects specifically working through environ-
mental channels and on the poor, or minorities, or both. 
 There are many ways to incorporate distributional analyses 
into RIAs and specifically benefit-cost analyses, from using distri-
butional weights to simply documenting them in a table as a side 
display. Side displays may be the most feasible scientifically, the 
most pragmatic politically, and the most informative for environ-
mental justice communities and other stakeholders. 
 By providing such distributional information, EPA would fur-
ther its environmental justice objectives, by providing the infor-
mation that all groups, including the poor, minorities, and envi-
ronmental justice communities, need to understand the impacts of 
a regulatory action. By incorporating such information into its  
RIAs, EPA would integrate environmental justice considerations 
into its development of regulations. Finally, by actually allowing 
the new information to inform the design and selection of regula-
tions so as to better protect disadvantaged groups, adding distribu-
tional impacts to RIAs would improve the distributive justice asso-
ciated with EPA’s actions as well as the procedural justice. In this 
way, EPA could truly weave environmental justice considerations 
into the “fabric” of its regulatory actions as it has recently pledged 
to do.101  
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Table 1A. Benefit-Cost Analyses for Policy A 
 
 
Group 
 
 
Costs 
 
Lives 
Saved 
Benefits 
without 
Hetero-
geneity 
Benefits 
with 
Hetero-
geneity 
Net 
Benefits 
without 
Hetero-
geneity 
Net 
Benefits 
with  
Hetero-
geneity 
Rich $1.7B 100 $600M $800M -$1.1B -$900M 
Poor 0 200 $1.2B $800M  $1.2B  $800M 
Total $1.7B 300 $1.8B $1.6B  $100M -$100M 
 
 
Table 1B. Benefit-Cost Analyses for Policy B 
 
 
Group 
 
 
Costs 
 
Lives 
Saved 
Benefits 
without 
Hetero-
geneity 
Benefits 
with 
Hetero-
geneity 
Net 
Benefits 
without 
Hetero-
geneity 
Net  
Benefits 
with  
Hetero-
geneity 
Rich $1.7B 200 $1.2B $1.6B -$500M -$100M 
Poor 0 50 $300M $200M  $300M  $200M 
Total $1.7B 250 $1.5B $1.8B -$200M  $100M 
Benefits without heterogeneity in willingness to pay are based on 
a VSL of $6M; benefits with heterogeneity are based on a VSL of 
$8M for the rich and $4M for the poor. 
 
  
30 JOURNAL OF LAND USE [Vol. 27:1 
 
Table 1C. Benefit-Cost Analyses for Policy C 
 
 
Group 
 
 
Costs 
 
Lives 
Saved 
Benefits 
without 
Hetero-
geneity 
Benefits 
with 
Hetero-
geneity 
Net 
Benefits 
without 
Hetero-
geneity 
Net 
Benefits 
with  
Hetero-
geneity 
Rich $350M 50 $300M $400M -$50M $50M 
Poor $350M 100 $600M $400M $250M $50M 
Total $700M 150 $900M $800M $200M $100M 
 
 
Table 1D. Benefit-Cost Analyses for Policy D 
 
 
Group 
 
 
Costs 
 
Lives 
Saved 
Benefits 
without 
Hetero-
geneity 
Benefits 
with 
Hetero-
geneity 
Net 
Benefits 
without 
Hetero-
geneity 
Net 
Benefits 
with 
Hetero-
geneity 
Rich $600M 100 $600M $800M $0 $200M 
Poor $100M 50 $300M $200M $200M $100M 
Total $700M 150 $900M $1B $200M $300M 
Benefits without heterogeneity in willingness to pay are based on 
a VSL of $6M; benefits with heterogeneity are based on a VSL of 
$8M for the rich and $4M for the poor. 
